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Cette étude évalue cinq expériences récentes de partage du travail au
Québec depuis 1994 : Bell Québec, Alcan, Les papiers Scott, le Ministère de
l'Environnement et de la Faune, et Sico. Le taux de participation aux programmes
de partage du travail offerts sur une base volontaire était élevé dans les entreprises
où les sacrifices que devaient consentir les travailleurs (les pertes salariales)
n'étaient pas considérables et dans celles où les travailleurs avaient déjà fait
l'expérience d'un horaire de travail flexible ou réduit. Dans les cas où le partage du
travail était imposé, les programmes ont remporté moins de succès. Nous déduisons
des conséquences en matière de politique publique. Entre autres, pour atteindre des
taux de participation plus élevés et initier les travailleurs à un horaire réduit, les
gouvernements peuvent jouer un rôle positif en finançant ou en aidant à démarrer
des programmes de partage du travail.
This paper evaluates five recent experiences of worksharing in Québec
since 1994: Bell Québec, Alcan, Scott Paper, the Ministère de l'Environnement et
de la Faune and Sico. Participation in voluntary worksharing programs was high
where workers' sacrifice (lost wages) was not great and where workers had
previous experience with shorter or flexible work hours. Where worksharing was
mandatory programs were less successful. We draw out implications for policy. To
achieve higher participation rates and to give workers experience with shorter
hours, governments can play a positive role in financing or kick-starting
worksharing programs.
Mots Clés : Partage du travail, heures de travail, Bell Québec, Alcan
Keywords : Worksharing, work hours, Bell Québec, Alcan
1Introduction: Why case studies are important
In the wake of stubborn levels of unemployment the call for more flexible
work arrangements and, in particular, worksharing has been renewed1.
Government policy, as ever, has not been isolated from these demands. The
Quebec government in its attempt to reduce the unemployment rate by two
percent by 2000 proposed in late 1996 a combination of measures concerning
work hours, including the reduction of the legal work week, an increase in
vacation time and non-paid sabbaticals. The response to these proposals like
those elsewhere has been predictable: without proportional (downward)
changes in wages, unions saw them as a means to gain a greater share of the
economic surplus, while employers viewed them as an increase in their unit
costs. As for policy makers, their reaction to these programs has been mixed.
While some analysts saw it as long-term solution to create new jobs, others
viewed it simply as a means to protect existing jobs. These varying views
arose to some extent because ’worksharing’ means different things to different
people.
Is this simply a case of déjà vu? A cursory review of the history of
worksharing reveals that demands for it have been made - and rejected -
during many of the major crises in North America and Europe since 1850
(Cross, 1989)2. Even during the Great Depression of the 1930s worksharing
was rejected by groups of workers and firms, and in the U.S. it was endorsed
without reservation only by Presidents Hoover and Roosevelt. But the context
in North America today is different. Labour markets are more open to the
forces of globalisation and the demographic profile of the labour market, as
well as the degree and nature of unionisation, are much different today than
they were in the 1930s. Worksharing practices in the 1990s, therefore, are a
break from previous experience.
Despite growing interest in worksharing and theoretical analyses of some of
the issues involved (Calmfors, 1985; Burdett and Wright, 1989; Fortin, 1989),
there are few case studies of its implementation in the 1990s. The case study
method is important because human resource departments tend to follow the
lead of a few selected firms that have received high levels of publicity; and
                                                
1
 The recent conference on "Changes in Working Time in Canada and the United States,"
(Ottawa, June 1996) brought together a number of authorities on worksharing from academic
institutions, trade unions, government agencies and public policy think-tanks.
2
 On Canada in the 1930s, see Struthers (1983); on the U.S., see Jacoby (1985); on Europe after
1945, see van Audenrode (1994).
2because governments, at the federal and provincial levels, rely on the case
study as a "testing ground" to monitor the effects of proposed initiatives.
This paper draws on five recent worksharing experiences in Quebec - Bell
Canada, Alcan, Scott Paper, Sico, and the Ministère de l'environnement et de
la faune - in an attempt to assess the viability of public policy intervention in
the area of work hours. Were successful worksharing programs associated
with a particular type of worker or enterprise? Was the likelihood of success
greater when the program was voluntary? Was the role of government critical
to the success of these programs? The case studies cover a range of sectors,
from the public to para public to private; to service and manufacturing; as
well, the cases include both urban and rural based industries. These
organisations are all large and unionised which in itself justifies their choice.
Previous studies of worksharing in Canada in the 1980s document that the
average size of firm with a worksharing program was generally small and non-
unionised3. The enterprises we have chosen to study can be considered
therefore to be on the vanguard of a new trend in the Canadian economy.
Our research suggests that worksharing is successful where organisational and
wage changes are not too abrupt, hence permitting the preferences of workers
and employers to coincide. This may not appear to be a surprising or novel
conclusion, but it is consistent with some elemental truths about how labour
markets operate that need to be considered when designing human resource
strategies or government programs. Workers' preferences and firms' choices
are consistent over time and they tend to be smooth. Economic agents can
make small adjustments at the margin and these results are more or less
predictable, but when large changes are demanded outcomes are uncertain. In
this light, government programs can play a role in smoothing abrupt changes
to life styles and to firms' organisation of work. But there is an additional role
governments can play. Workers' preferences are linked to previous
worksharing experiences and without past practice to draw upon, participation
rates are generally low. Through the use of properly directed incentives, such
as kick-start programs, policy can raise initial participation rates, thereby
giving workers the needed experience to make programs successful.
This paper is divided in four sections. Section 1 offers some definitions of
different approaches to worksharing. Section 2 provides background
information on the case studies. Section 3 gives a comparative analysis of their
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 A survey (N = 953) by Employment and Immigration Canada (1993) reported that the average
size of firm with a worksharing program employed about 130 workers (of which, on average, 30
workers actually participated in the program); 14 percent of firms were unionised.
3successes and failures. Section 4 evaluates the role of government policy in
the area.
The Dimensions of Worksharing
The literature on worksharing is diffuse because of the various ways the term
has been applied. To some it is the reduction of work hours over the business
cycle to save jobs; to others it refers to the reduction of work hours to create
permanent long-term jobs. Of course, these types of worksharing programs are
not mutually exclusive; but they can exhibit conflicting outcomes. Hoarding
workers can reduce productivity and profitability and hence dampen the long-
run potential of hiring additional workers. On the other hand, a successful
program may lead to higher levels of productivity that could reduce the
demand for workers at the firm level. It is important as well to distinguish
between micro and macro aspects of worksharing. Owing to the reduction in
aggregate demand, if all firms are encouraged to workshare, there maybe
fewer jobs to go around at the economy-wide level.
Because of its different varieties and outcomes, we have thought it best to
distinguish between three dimensions of worksharing:
1) Worksharing can be seen as voluntary agreements between individuals and
firms to reduce the length of the work week in order to give the employee
more flexibility in her choice of work hours and the firm more choice in the
type of worker that it wishes to hire4. In these circumstances, workers who
prefer worksharing arrangements find firms offering this type of contract.
These agreements can be found in all states (good and bad business years) and
are not necessarily tied directly to the creation of new jobs, but if voluntary
agreements held across the economy, rising productivity and lower unit costs
could lead to higher levels of employment. There are limitations to these types
of arrangements. Drolet and Morissette (1997), drawing upon evidence from
the Survey of Work Arrangements for 1995, found that 66.6 per cent of
Canadian workers preferred working the same hours; 27.1 per cent more hours
at more pay; and only 6.4 per cent fewer hours at less pay. In Quebec,
however, there is a greater preference (7.9 per cent) to work fewer hours.
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 These are worksharing agreements because they offer workers a shorter work week in the
expectation that reduced hours per worker will translate into more jobs. See Rosen (1986) for an
analysis of the matching of preferences with respect to work hours.
4Overall, the results suggest that many Canadians are working less and not
more hours than they desire5.
2) Worksharing can be used as business strategy to hoard labour during an
economic downturn6. In the nineteenth century and into the depression of the
1930s, this type of initiative was often referred to as ’short time.’ As its name
implies, this is short-term policy which does not create new jobs, although it
does reduce layoffs. Nor does it necessitate major changes in the organisation
of work or changes in attitudes towards work. Firms make investments in their
workers and they want to avoid incurring high costs of search when business
recovers7. This type of worksharing program is defensive and like any labour
hoarding scheme entails lower productivity and higher unit costs for the firm.
Some workers would be willing to take some reduction in earnings (as long as
their salary remained above some alternative level, say the amount provided
by unemployment insurance), if they were assured that firms would resume
working full hours when business improved. Still there would be others who
would seek employment at firms working full-time. If these are firms’ best
workers (workers with higher opportunity costs), productivity at the plant
level could decline for this reason as well.
3) Governments and firms have conceived of introducing worksharing as a
means to moderate the effects of structural change8. Whether initiated by firms
or government, this policy is long-term in nature and it may not be voluntary.
Governments could set limits on the number of work hours per week or per
year (including overtime) in the hope that the reduction in hours worked per
person would translate into more jobs. Faced by declining market share or a
general fall in demand, and constrained by their inability to cut wage rates or
layoff workers, firms may introduce a reduced work week on a permanent
basis in order to lower labour costs. Whether these initiatives create new jobs
or preserve old ones depends on the substitution of hours and workers, but
even assuming a favorable elasticity employers and policy makers are faced
with the problem of persuading employed workers to take cuts in their
earnings (due to fewer hours worked). Moreover, a long-term policy to work
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 The Drolet and Morissette (1997) findings suggest as well that the characteristics (location, age,
sex, and education) of workers preferring more or less work hours are different, making any
transfer between the two groups unlikely and unfeasible. See also Kahn and Lang (1995).
6
 See Okun (1981) for a discussion of labour hoarding.
7
 However, it is often speculated that where employees work long hours a reduction in the work
week may raise their performance levels. This begs the question why firms would not always and
everywhere work shorter hours.
8
 For examples of this approach, see the recent recommendations in the Report of the Advisory
Group on Working Time and the Distribution of Work (1994).
5fewer hours would compel firms to make the necessary changes in scheduling
and in their organisations. Under a government initiative of a reduced work
week to reduce unemployment, firms would incur the additional costs of
hiring new workers. The net effect on productivity may not be neutral.
Workers’ morale might deteriorate if they were forced to take a cut in
earnings; firms may not make the appropriate changes in work schedules, and,
combined with the effects of hiring new and untrained workers, productivity
may deteriorate.
The three dimensions of worksharing need to be separated because of their
varying impact on workers’ wages, productivity and on firms’ organisation.
The voluntary dimension of worksharing poses no problem in that the sorting
of workers and firms is efficient because it matches like and like. A labour
hoarding policy, usually initiated by firms, may be acceptable to workers, if
they knew that their earnings would be restored during the subsequent upturn.
High-seniority workers, however, may be more reluctant because their labour
contracts often guarantee them a certain number of hours. For firms, because
of its temporary nature, a labour-hoarding policy would not call for important
organisational changes, such as major adjustments of work schedules.
Worksharing in the context of structural change is more problematic because
it entails the greatest adjustment: workers have their income reduced while
firms have to make organisational changes.
The three dimensions of worksharing pose different sets of options for
government. In the hope of improving a better match of workers and firms
governments can facilitate the diffusion of information about jobs. Using their
existing manpower centres, provincial and federal authorities have made
attempts to this end. In order to encourage firms to hoard labour and not to
penalise part-time or short-time workers, governments might consider making
hours and not complete weeks worked the basis for unemployment insurance
eligibility. Reid (1985) identified some ways this could be achieved and the
last round of changes in unemployment insurance has moved in this direction.
Finally, to promote long-term adjustment governments may need to regulate
work hours in combination with financial incentives. A long-term policy to
workshare and to stabilise if not add to the workforce is not necessarily
unfeasible at the plant level, but it must be recognized that additional
resources have to be expanded to smooth over changes confronted by both
sides of the labour market. The danger is, as the following cases make clear,
that if additional resources are not expanded then worksharing may have
perverse results.
6Five examples of worksharing
Bell Canada:
Until changes in the regulatory environment threatened its market share, Bell
Canada was relatively insulated from competition9. Its unionised workers had
a long attachment to the enterprise, 15 years in the case of technicians, and
their seniority determined their conditions of work. But in November 1993,
confronted by new competition, the company announced a plan without
precedent in its history to reduce costs and cut its labour force by the
equivalent of 5,000 workers. Elements of Bell’s plan along with those of the
four other cases are found in Table 1. Aimed at workers in all regions of
Ontario and Quebec, the plan combined incentives to leave the company,
reduce work time before retirement, increase vacation time without pay and to
shorten the work week. From our discussions with Bell management, the plan
was intended to respond to structural changes in the industry. At the outset the
plan was intended to be voluntary and initially Bell attempted to get federal
government assistance for its workers on reduced time10. But by December
1993 it was evident that Ottawa would not subsidize its workers and the
company concluded that a voluntary program was unfeasible. In the context of
the renewal of its collective agreement, the company negotiated new clauses in
its contract to reduce the length of the work week. Technicians would reduce
their work week from a schedule of "5 days/40 hours a week" to a schedule of
"4 days/36 hours a week"11. The work day was thus longer, with workers
having the opportunity to take their days off on either Monday or Friday.
Wages fell by about 10 per cent. The new work week implied that the firm
would have to reorganize its scheduling in order to meet its clients needs. The
agreement was to last one year.
Alcan:
The Alcan complex in the Saguenay-Lac St. Jean region of Quebec comprises
both old and relatively new installations; in total the number of workers in all
Quebec plants has fallen from over 9,000 in 1980 to 6,300 in 199412. In 1990
the company initiated a period of restructuring with the aim to rationalise
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 A more complete account of the Bell experience is found in Huberman and Lacroix (1996).
10
 The Canadian government has run experimental initiatives on a limited basis in which it has
subsidised firms and workers instituting worksharing programs. For a history of these programs,
see Pal (1983); Reid (1985). Gray (1996) provides a more recent analysis.
11
 The evidence in this paper, including Table 1, considers exclusively technicians in the Quebec
branch of Bell, unless otherwise mentioned.
12
 The Alcan experience is based on interviews and site visits conducted between June 1996 and
May 1997.
7production in the more modern, technologically advanced installations. Its
unionised workers are among the most highly paid in the region and have an
average seniority of about 20 years. In the early 1990s the firm had called on
funds available from the federal government to subsidise workers on reduced
hours, and workers have had since 1988 the possibility of banking overtime
hours and have used them to supplement vacation periods. The point here is
that both firms and workers had some prior experience, in the face of a long
period of layoffs and restructuring, of adjusting hours of work. A formal
agreement in October 1995 with its union provided for a voluntary program of
reduced work time. The program, which obtained subsidies from both the
federal and provincial governments ($460 per worker in 1996, $230 in 1997,
$115 in 1998), was aimed at all personnel, with the exception of management,
or about 3,000 workers. The program was itself part of a larger collective
agreement that gave workers a $0.45 increase per hour in 1996 and similar
increases in 1997 and 1998, and workers who participated in the initiative
received additional bonuses of $0.25 per hour. Including the contributions of
both levels of governments, but excluding the negotiated pay increases, wages
of workers participating in the program decreased about 2.9 per cent in the
first year and 3.7 per cent in its last year. Workers received a guarantee of job
security for the length of the three year agreement. In exchange, the firm
would continue with its policy of technical and organisational change, and the
union agreed to participate in the firm’s reskilling initiatives (le processus
d'amélioration continu et du virage qualité.)
The program consisted of reducing paid work time from 40 to 38 hours, or
from 35 to 33 hours (for white collar workers). Employees would continue to
follow their regular schedules and work week and there was no disruption in
the flow of output. The two additional work hours would be banked and be
used as vacation time. The intent was to create permanent jobs for workers
who had been laid off in the past due to reorganisation. About 66 per cent of
workers accepted to participate in the initiative, but their adhesion was
renewable, again on a voluntary basis, after they had accumulated 33 or 38
hours of non-paid work time.
Scott Paper:
Scott Paper is a large company producing paper products with plants in a
number of Canadian provinces. In 1990 the economic context in the industry
began to deteriorate, and Sico, like firms elsewhere, announced a series of
layoffs. To reduce costs further in the md 1990s the firm started to rationalise
its activity at its Ontario and Quebec plants, an initiative which it is still
8undertaking. Its Quebec plant in Crabtree, a town of about 5,000 inhabitants
70 kilometers from Montreal, employed in the early 1990s about 400 workers.
In 1994, the firm announced it intended to lay off 100 hundred workers.
During negotiations with its union, the firm was able to save most of these
jobs owing to retirement, voluntary departures and worksharing agreements.
Over its three years, the collective agreement stipulated wage increases of 2
per cent, 2.5 per cent and 1.5 per cent per annum.
Citing administrative constraints, the worksharing arrangement was limited to
a small group of 60 workers in one division of the Crabtree plant. The workers
were mostly female with 25 years of seniority and whose average age was 45
years. The plan which was voluntary provided workers the opportunity to
reduce their work week from 5 to 4, or 5 to 3 days. The Quebec government
provided funds to the firm to manage this change, but, unlike Alcan, it was not
intended to supplement workers’ lost wages directly. Workers’ earnings were
reduced about proportionately with days lost. About 18 per cent of workers
volunteered for the 5 to 4 day program, 1.6 per cent for the 5 to 3day variant;
workers could renew their adhesion on an annual basis.
Ministère de l'environnement et de la faune (MEF):
Forced to reduce its expenditure, the Quebec government has sought to cut its
labour costs in the public sector13. Its worksharing initiatives were aimed to
avoid layoffs and also to encourage firms in the private and para public sector
to follow its lead. In late 1995, the MEF negotiated an agreement with its
union that enabled its 2,900 employees both in the office and in the field to
work reduced hours on a voluntary basis. Two types of programs were
available: Workers could choose to have their work week reduced from 40 to
36 or 32 hours or from 35 to 32 or 28 hours; alternatively they could work
their normal work week (40 or 35 hours) but be paid for 36, 32 or 28 hours,
and accumulate, along the lines of Alcan workers, work hours as vacation
time. The government offered no financial incentive to workers and this meant
that they suffered potential wage losses ranging from 8.6 to 20 per cent.
Workers could renew their adhesion to the program after six months. About
15 per cent of the ministry’s workers volunteered for the program of which 58
per cent were male workers. The number of workers adhering to the 40 to
36/32 variant was about 5 per cent; from 35 to 32/28, 10 per cent. Most
workers decided to reduce their work week instead of accumulating vacation
time.
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 The MEF experience is based on interviews conducted between January and March 1997.
9Sico:
Sico, a manufacturing firm producing paint for residential and commercial
use, has three main plants in Quebec. We studied the worksharing agreement
at its Longueuil installation, a plant employing 130 workers located in a
suburb of Montreal. In 1997, at the renewal of the collective agreement, the
union sought a reduction of the work week from 40 to 36 hours without any
pay cut. Workers were concerned with improving their quality of life; the
question of job creation or consolidation was secondary. At this time, the firm
had no plans to make organisational or technological changes, nor was it
intending to downsize. After long negotiations, a worksharing agreement,
endorsed by the workers, was adopted. As at Bell, Sico employees moved
from a "5 days/40 hours a week" to a "4 days/36 hours a week" schedule, with
their days off restricted to Mondays or Fridays. In exchange, the firm would
not have to give any pay increases during the length of the new collective
agreement of three years. The firm also gained some flexibility. Workers
accepted some reclassification of their jobs which eased the transition to a new
schedule. Daily working hours were to be longer and concentrated in the
middle of the week (Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday), and since these are
the firm’s peak business days this meant less over-time hours. The pre-layoff
announcement period was reduced from 6 to 2 months. The worksharing
program has entailed some direct cost to workers, including the sacrifice of a
wage increase and some over-time hours. Finally, it was agreed that the
change in the work schedule would have to be reassessed after one year in
light of the results obtained under three criteria: cost per liter of paint; quality
of the service (percentage of orders delivered on time); and absenteeism.
Program results
The popularity of the programs and their outcomes are associated with the
demands or sacrifices placed on workers. Consider Figure 1 which traces an
"indifference curve" of the tradeoff between loss in (gross) wages and the
participation rate in the programs. The figure comprises eight observations.
Alcan, Scott and the MEF offered two choices to their workers; the Bell
observations are from the survey conducted by the firm in the months before
the involuntary program; there was no choice offered at Sico. The curve
illustrates a declining rate of participation as the sacrifice incurred increases. It
flattens when wage loss is high because there will always be some workers
10
who want to work less; conversely the curve is nearly vertical at low rates of
sacrifice. Scott is an outlier, owing perhaps to the small size of its program.
The tradeoff between participation rates and wage sacrifice confirms the
importance of distinguishing between the three dimensions of worksharing
outlined earlier. Scott and the MEF intended to pursue a long-term policy of
worksharing in the context of structural change (dimension 3), but
participation rates were low because of the sacrifice workers would have had
to incur. As a result, these organisations failed to accommodate those workers
who may have wished to work fewer hours, but not as few as set out in the
plan. This points to the general difficulty faced by workers and firms in
negotiating individual contracts. In principle, workers sort between firms to
find the right offer of wages and hours (as set out in dimension 1). In practice,
workers find it difficult to move and their own employer cannot always offer
them their preferred wage-hour package.
It is reasonable to ask whether, because of low participation rates, the MEF
and Scott will continue with its programs. Yet we were led to believe that
neither organisation is planning to scrap their initiatives. As for changes in
participation rates over time, because the programs have been in place for only
a limited period it is difficult to draw any conclusions. Indeed the results are
conflicting which may simply reflect the fact that many workers with no
previous history with these type of programs are making adjustments as they
acquire experience. The participation rate at the MEF was around 13 per cent
when the program was launched in April 1996, rising to 15 per cent in April
1997; but the trend at Alcan is in the opposite direction, and as of November
1997, participation rates at Alcan have fallen to about 60 per cent from 66 per
cent at the outset14.
The employment effects are proportional to the size of the work force and to
the participation rate. In total, the five worksharing programs may have saved
or consolidated more than 300 full-time jobs which is not negligible (a total of
8500 employees had access to the programs). Having said that, Bell, the
largest employer in the sample and whose program was involuntary, had
substantially altered its commitment after one year.
The productivity effects of the programs are mixed. Lanoie et al. (1996) have
shown that at Bell technicians’ productivity declined during the worksharing
period. They attributed this outcome to longer work days (the new schedule
11
did not mesh with clients’ needs), to the fact that workers were less than
enthusiastic with the involuntary nature of the program, and to evidence that
managers were not prepared to meet changes in the work environment.
Referring back to the three different dimensions outlined in Section Two, the
firm sought to initiate a long-term strategy (dimension 3) without government
aid or changes in its organisation. Although the firm was able to maintain
employment levels, productivity fell. The outcome was a type of labour
hoarding strategy (2) and productivity declining as expected. The Bell
experience casts doubt about the potential success of worksharing programs to
confront structural problems, like the menace of deregulation. In its new
economic context the firm needed to raise productivity, but no measures were
put in place to insure this outcome. It is not surprising that with the demise of
its worksharing program, the firm has resorted to layoffs.
For voluntary programs the relation between worksharing and productivity at
the firm level is ambiguous. Sico has reported improvements in the three
evaluation criteria related to productivity. But at the MEF the productivity
record is mixed. Managers have observed a reduction in the quality of the
work done, an increase in the delays for the services to the clientele and more
difficulty in organizing meetings. At Alcan there is no indication of any
change in productivity related to the program. The work schedule has not
changed since employees in the program are working on their normal schedule
and many are accumulating additional vacation time. A negative impact on
productivity may have resulted if replacement workers were less productive
than regular ones. There is no indication of this however, since replacement
during vacation periods is done by workers on a "calling list" who have
previous experience at Alcan.
The success of the Alcan and Sico experiences deserves some further
comment. The Alcan program is an example of a long-term strategy (3), but its
continuing success is intimately related to the fact that changes demanded by
the firsm were not great (1). Alcan was able to accommodate itself to its
workforce, and, as ever, where like meets like positive outcomes result. The
firm achieved its goal of hiring new workers and rehiring others on waiting
lists. Of the five cases studied the Alcan program was perhaps the most
flexible because workers had the choice of continuing or entering the program
after 19 weeks, thereby making it more tempting for reluctant workers (those
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 At Bell, managers and workers attest that if a survey would be conducted one year after the
introduction of the program, voluntary participation rates would be higher than the 10 per cent
rate (Figure 1) found before the program was in place.
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at the margin) to join. Attesting to its success the program is still in place. The
Sico experience is also striking since the company was able to accommodate
its workers and rearrange working hours in a way that better fits its clients’
needs. It would certainly be worthwhile to follow this experience after a year
or two.
The role of policy
Many economists would concur that there are positive externalities to job
creation and that government intervention to encourage worksharing practices
can be warranted. From the cases we have studied, we can draw a number of
lessons with respect to policy formation based either on regulation, financial
incentives or the diffusion of information,
The Bell confirms the view that worksharing is not desirable when firms are
struck by structural shocks, such as technological change, deregulation, and
increased international competition. At best, worksharing can be of some use
during a transition period. For example, to ease the transition to the market
economy the German government is subsidising - on a short-term basis -
workers on short-time in uncompetitive industries in the former East Germany
(Mosley and Kruppe, 1995). As for cyclical shocks, many firms in Canada are
already engaging in labour hoarding, although government policies can be
designed, such as current reforms to the unemployment insurance scheme,
which encourage firms and workers at the margin to reduce work hours
instead of accepting layoffs as the only viable alternative15.
There is little room for government in regulating hours (dimension 3), either
in periods of cyclical or structural change, as is currently at issue in France.
The Bell worksharing program was a negotiated agreement between two
parties but it resulted in lower productivity. Governments would be hard
pressed to do better.
The case studies do reveal that there is room for financial aid to ’kick-start’ an
interest in worksharing in order to better align the preferences of workers and
firms. In terms of Figure 1, a small incentive can have a large impact on an
initially low participation rate (the vertical stretch of the curve). A short-term
incentive program could have long-lasting effects, because workers and firms
learn from past experience and many workers who have adopted worksharing
appear to like it. There is a catch, however. A relatively large increase in
                                                
15
 Abraham and Houseman (1993) review these issues.
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participation will occur only if the gross wage loss involved in a work sharing
program is initially fairly low. Note that even with the possibility of
government aid, according to surveys conducted, the participation rate at Bell
would not have been great because the initial sacrifice was in the 10 per cent
range. Finally, financial incentives can also be put in place to smooth the
transition from full to reduced work hours and ease organisational changes
confronted by firms (dimension 1). Representatives from Alcan and Scott
attest to the fact that federal and provincial assistance contributed in this way
to their programs’ success. 
Direct financial aid to selected firms, especially prominent para public
enterprises, may prove to be unpopular and difficult to sustain financially.
Alternatively, government using its existing manpower facilities can help
diffuse information to facilitate matches between workers and firms. As well,
governments can disseminate information about successful experiences,
whether in Canada or abroad, and the organisational changes put in place to
smooth firm and worker adjustment. Finally, government can play a leading
role with its own employees. As we observed previously, worksharing is not
popular in cases where contracts provide high-seniority workers a guaranteed
number of work hours. Governments could take the lead in modifying these
types of clauses with their own workers.
Conclusion
Worksharing is by no means a solution to the problem of unemployment. But
the case studies we have examined show in fact that government involvement
can be positive. Policy should be based on financial incentives and
information dissemination as opposed to regulating work hours. In fact, policy
can act as a substitute for history. The proportion of workers and firms having
had past experience with worksharing is actually quite small. How can these
agents learn? Government programs can prove crucial here as a means to
spread information and to give workers and firms trial experience at little cost.
Of course, this does not necessarily translate into higher levels of employment
which depends on the elasticity of substitution of hours and numbers
employed. It may simply imply that office and factory schedules are more in
tune with those working - which in itself is a worthy objective.
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Table 1 : Five case studies of work sharing : Context, Program and Results
ALCAN BELL 1 MEF SCOTT PAPER SICO
CONTEXT negotiated threat of layoffs threat of layoffs
and wage cuts
negotiated /
threat of layoffs
regular renewal
of the collective
agreement
Organizational
change yes no no yes no
Salary gains yes no no yes no
Financial aid of
enterprise yes no no no yes
Financial aid of
government
restricted to those
enrolled in program no no aid to all workers no
PROGRAM voluntary involuntary
voluntary (with the
agreement of
management)
voluntary program accepted by
a vote of 95%
Potential workers all workers technicians all workers Restricted(60 / 400 workers)
everyone except
managers and clerical
workers
Choices available 40 h → 38 h or35 h → 33 h
5 d → 4 d and
40 h → 36 h
35 h → 32 h or
35 h → 28 h
5 d → 4 d or
5 d → 3 d
5 d → 4 d and
40 h → 36 h
Impact on fringe
benefits no change no change no change
proportional
reduction no change
Additional time off additional vacationtime reduced work week
reduced work week
or additional
vacation time
reduced work week reduced work week
Length of
agreement
renewable after the
accumulation of
33/38 hours
one year renewable every 6
months renewable yearly
Renewable
(collectively) after an
evaluation following
the 1st year of
implementation
RESULTS
Participation rate 66.5% 100%(voluntary : 7%)
35 h → 32 h: 10.8%
35 h → 28 h:   2.7%
5 d → 4 d: 18.3%
5 d → 3 d:   1.6% 100%
Gross salary
-2.9% 1st year
-3.4% 2nd year
-3.7% 3rd year
-10% 35 h → 32 h: -  8.6%35 h → 28 h: -20.0%
5 d → 4 d: -20.0%
5 d → 3 d: -40.0%
no reduction, but no
pay increase during
the three years of the
collective agreement
Productivity no change negative effect mixed results no change
improvement (six
months after the
implementation)
Employment effect 102 new jobs 200 jobs saved 38 jobs saved 2 jobs saved ? ?
h: hours
d: days
1
 This information pertains to the program as it was applied for the technicians
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